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Climate Change, Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary Principle 
 
Lisa Heinzerling* 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 In the summer of 2003, at least 20,000 people died in a heat wave that spanned 
western Europe.1 France lost the most lives: 14,802, according to a government report 
produced in the aftermath of the tragedy.2  Thousands of people also died in Great 
Britain, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands.3  The death toll 
mounted so stealthily, however, that news accounts written fully two weeks into the 
four-week heat wave focused more on the inconveniences and even economic bonuses 
of the record-setting temperatures than on their lethal consequences.4  Eventually the 
disaster was undeniable: heat-related deaths so overwhelmed French mortuaries, for 
example, that bodies were stored in refrigerated trucks and warehouses while awaiting 
burial or cremation.5 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Sarah Nealen 
for excellent research assistance. 
1 Some accounts place the death toll as high as 35,000.  See Janet Larsen, Record Heat 
Wave in Europe Takes 35,000 Lives, Earth Policy Institute (Oct. 9, 2003), available at 
http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/Update.29.htm. 
2 “France heat wave death toll set at 14,802,” USA TODAY, Sept. 25, 2003, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/weather/news/2003-09-25-france-heat_x.htm.  
3 J. P. Sardon, “The 2003 heat wave,” 12 EUROSURVEILLANCE 3 (Mar. 2007), available 
at http://www.eurosurveillance.org/em/v12n03/1203-226.asp. 
4 Angelique Chrisafis, “The height of summer: heatwave edges close to record,” THE 
GUARDIAN, Aug. 5, 2003, available at 
http://environment.guardian.co.uk/climatechange/story/0,,1850064,00.html.  
5“‘Over 11,000’ dead in French heat,” BBC NEWS, Aug. 29, 2003, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3190585.stm; see also Philip Delves 
Broughton, “Hundreds of heatwave bodies unclaimed as Paris struggles to clear 
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 A study published in the prestigious scientific journal Nature in 2004 deemed it 
“likely” that human-induced increases in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gases had “more than doubled the risk of European mean summer temperatures as hot 
as 2003.”6  The same study found, based on scenarios assuming unmitigated future 
greenhouse gas emissions, that every other year would be as warm as 2003 in Europe 
by the 2040s, and that by 2100, a summer like 2003 “would be classed as an 
anomalously cold summer relative to the new climate.”7 
 The European heat wave is a dramatic illustration of the two central factual 
premises of this Article: climate change harms human health and we know that climate 
change is happening.  These facts justify a reframing of the public debate on climate 
change in two ways.  First, we should do more to highlight the consequences of climate 
change for human health.  Second, we should recognize that the precautionary moment 
for action on climate change – the period in which we might have acted based on 
something less than a scientific consensus on the causes and consequences of climate 
change – has passed.  We are in a post-cautionary world now.  Together, the effects of 
climate change on human health and the undeniable fact that climate change is upon us 
                                                                                                                                                             
backlog,” TELEGRAPH, Aug. 24, 2003, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/08/25/wfra25.xml.  
6 Peter A. Stott et al., Human contribution to the European heatwave of 2003, 432 
Nature 610 (Dec. 2004). 
7 “Europe heatwave killed some 19,000,” CHINA DAILY, Sept. 26, 2003, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-09/26/content_267640.htm; see also 
Catharine Brahic, “Med to get five times as many dangerously hot days,” 
NEWSCIENTIST, June 18, 2007, available at 
http://environment.newscientist.com/article/dn12086-med-to-get-five-times-as-many-
dangerously-hot-days.html for more recent study.  
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have several implications for public policy.  Perhaps most important, they create a 
moral imperative for action – dramatic action, now – on this problem. 
I.  CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN HEALTH 
 There has long been discussion of the implications of climate change for human 
health,8 and the link between climate change and human health has been drawn ever 
more clearly in recent years.9  But it is also true that widely circulated images of current 
harms from climate change – melting glaciers, collapsing ice shelves, drowning polar 
bears – do not have a human face.  And it takes some reflection to see the connection 
between human health and, say, higher water temperatures – reflection that is not 
always encouraged in our busy world.  Thus, although my suggestion that we frame the 
debate over responses to climate change in terms of effects on human health is by no 
means original, it is worthwhile to draw, directly and emphatically, the link between 
climate change and human health, and to think about the consequences of this linkage 
for policies addressing climate change. 
A.  HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
“The weakest are dropping like flies.” 
-- Patrick Pelloux, 
president of the association of French 
accident and emergency doctors, 
commenting on 2003 European heatwave10 
 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., REID A. BRYSON & THOMAS J. MURRAY, CLIMATES OF HUNGER: MANKIND AND 
THE WORLD’S CHANGING WEATHER (1977). 
9 See, e.g., WHO, Climate Change and Human Health – Risks and Responses (2003). 
10 Stephan Steinberg, “Thousands die in European heat wave,” 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/aug2003/heat-a14.shtml (August 14, 2003).  
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 More frequent and intense heat waves are only one item on the long list of the 
consequences of climate change that will harm human health.  According to the latest 
scientific research, we can expect the following in our warming world:  disease-carrying 
insects will alter their ranges, appearing in places they have not been before and where 
humans have not developed immunities, causing more widespread incidence of vector-
borne diseases such as malaria;11 after a slight uptick, crop productivity will decline, 
causing a concomitant increase in the risk of malnutrition;12 fish stocks will deteriorate, 
to the same effect;13 ground-level ozone will worsen, causing adverse pulmonary and 
cardiovascular events;14 water supplies will decrease due to reduced snowpack and 
increased drought;15 storms will become more frequent and severe, threatening Katrina-
like consequences for human health and welfare; flooding will grow more frequent and 
severe due to storms and sea level rise; 16 diarrhoeal disease will increase due to floods 
and drought;17 cholera will grow more frequent and toxic due to higher water 
temperatures;18 sanitation facilities will fail more often due to more frequent extreme 
                                                 
11 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, WORKING GROUP II 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 7 
(2007). 
12 IPCC, at 7. 
13 Id. at 8. 
14 Id. at 7. 
15 Id. at 9. 
16 Id. at 7. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 9. 
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weather events, leading to increased spread of infectious diseases;19 ozone depletion 
will worsen with a changing climate,20 leading to increased incidence of skin cancer, 
cataracts, and immune deficiency;21 increased pollen production will exacerbate 
allergies;22 hunger and malnutrition will rise due to drought and extreme weather 
events.23   
 Reviewing this list, it appears that there is almost no component of human health 
that will be untouched by climate change.  And the list does not end here.  The 
shrinking resource base of a warming world will also increase the likelihood of refugee 
crises, violent conflicts, and even wars.  In this regard, it is notable that the U.S. 
Department of Defense appears to have cottoned on to the potentially catastrophic 
effects of climate change even while the Environmental Protection Agency was fighting 
hard not to do anything about them.  A 2003 report commissioned by the Pentagon – 
dated a month after EPA itself declined to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean 
Air Act24 – “imagine[s] the unthinkable” by describing the consequences of an abrupt 
                                                 
19 See Climate Institute, Impact of Climate Change on Human Health, at 39, available at 
http://www.climate.org/topics/health/index.shtml. 
20 Philip Ball, Climate Change Set to Poke Holes in Ozone, available at 
http://www.nature.com/news/2004/040301/full/040301-
5.html;jsessionid=76983011C67755B96E11DFA626C2FCE0. 
21 For EPA’s description of the health effects of the increased exposure to ultraviolet 
radiation that comes from ozone depletion, see Health Effects of Overexposure to the 
Sun, at http://www.epa.gov/sunwise/uvandhealth.html. 
22 IPCC, at 3. 
23 Id. at 14. 
24 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 
52,922–23 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
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shift in climate due to slowing of the ocean’s thermohaline circulation.25  The report 
predicts that shortages in the basic necessities of life – food, water, and energy resources 
– would result from abrupt climate change,26 and that these shortages would in turn 
either cause or exacerbate global conflict.27  In the event of drastically lowered carrying 
capacities due to abrupt climate change, the report states bluntly, “Humanity would 
revert to its norm of constant battles for diminishing resources, which the battles 
themselves would further reduce even beyond the climatic effects.  Once again warfare 
would define human life.”28   
 The Pentagon report deliberately looked at extreme possibilities, noting that “it is 
DOD’s job to consider such scenarios.”29  But the report’s dire predictions do not seem 
so extreme anymore.  In April 2007, eleven retired U.S. generals and admirals signed a 
study, commissioned by the government-funded Center for Naval Analyses, describing 
the national security consequences of climate change.30  Calling climate change a “threat 
multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world,” the study 
details the ways in which climate change may push already fragile nations over the 
                                                 
25 Peter Schwartz & Doug Randall, An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its 
Implications for United States National Security (October 2003).  The thermohaline 
circulation is the “conveyor belt” that moves warm water “from the tropics toward the 
poles,” warming Europe.  ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE: MAN, 
NATURE, AND CLIMATE CHANGE 56-57 (2006). 
26 Schwartz & Randall, supra note 25, at 14-15. 
27 Id. at 14, 16-19. 
28 Id. at 16-17. 
29 Id. at 8. 
30 The CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (April 
2007). 
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brink and put strain on even the most developed nations.31  “To live in stability,” the 
study observes, “human societies need access to certain fundamental resources, the 
most important of which are water and food.”32  Yet, as the study makes clear, these 
basic resources – and thus the stability on which national security depends – are 
threatened by climate change.33  Armed conflict,34 mass migration,35 and even 
terrorism36 are among the national security consequences the study associates with 
climate change.  The seriousness of these consequences, and their link to climate 
change, were highlighted just one day after this study was published, when the United 
Nations Security Council met for the very first time to discuss climate change as a 
security issue.37 
 The human health consequences of climate change are not just worries for the 
remote future; they are happening here and now.  In addition to the research on the 
relationship between Europe’s disastrous heat wave and climate change, other studies 
have also found a probable connection between current adverse health consequences 
and climate change.38 Already, for example, researchers have found that the changing 
                                                 
31 Id. at 17, 29. 
32 Id. at 18. 
33 Id. at 13, 15, 20, 25, 27, 30, 32. 
34 Id. at 15, 18, 21. 
35 Id. at 29, 34. See also Christian Aid, Human Tide: The Real Migration Crisis (May 
2007). 
36 Id. at 20, 21. 
37 U.N. Security Council, Department of Public Information, Security Council Holds 
First-Ever Debate of Impact of Climate Change on Peace, Security, Hearing Over 50 
Speakers, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9000.doc.htm/ 
38 WHO, The World Health Report 2002, at 72, available at 
http://www.who.int./whr/2002/en/whr2002_en.pdf. 
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climate has likely influenced the geographic range of disease-carrying insects.39  
Perhaps more remarkably, climate change has also been cited as an underlying cause of 
current armed conflict.  The genocide in Darfur, for example, is now regarded as having 
arisen at least in part from territorial disputes caused by persistent drought conditions 
associated with a warming world.40 
 As if all this were not bad enough, the health consequences I have described will 
almost certainly be the worst for the poorest among us, who are least able to fend off or 
bounce back from such stressors.41  The world’s poorest nations already suffer from the 
kinds of food and water shortages that will only worsen in the coming years; their 
capacity to handle further scarcity is limited.42  They also lack the resources (such as 
funds for relocation necessitated by rising sea levels) and services (such as health care) 
that will be necessary in any effort to mitigate the effects of climate change.43  Adding 
insult to injury, the poorest countries are also those that have contributed the least to 
the present problem.44  This inequity might itself lead to a further downward spiral in 
                                                 
39 Stephen Y. Liang et al., Climate Change and the Monitoring of Vector-borne Disease, 287 
JAMA 2286 (2002); GELBSPAN at 119-120. 
40 National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, at 15; Stephan Faris, The Real 
Roots of Darfur, Atlantic Monthly (April 2007). 
41 Andrew C. Revkin, The climate divide: Rich nations find it easier to adapt, New York 
Times (Apr. 2, 2007). 
42 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, Part II.4 (2006), available at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 29. 
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human welfare by fueling conflicts, perhaps even armed conflicts, between the climate 
haves and have-nots.45 
B.  POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
"We have to give climate change a human face – it is not all about 'sinks,' 
'emission trading schemes' and technology. Climate change is about people, 
children, families and … our relationship with the world around us. " 
 
-- Sheila Watt-Cloutier 
chair, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, November 200446 
 
 What are the consequences, for public debate and public policy, of framing the 
problem of climate change in terms of human health?  I believe framing the problem 
this way has at least three implications: motivating political action, enlarging the 
number and kinds of governmental institutions involved in the problem, and creating a 
strong moral case for action. 
 First, and most pragmatically, “environmental” threats rarely capture the 
attention of the public and policymakers unless and until they are linked to human 
health.  People are worried about the polar bear, to be sure, but it is doubtful that the 
polar bear’s plight alone – or even the added plight of the many other species 
threatened by climate change – will prompt the kinds of large changes necessary to 
address climate change.  To take an example from early in the environmental era, many 
studies connected the pesticide DDT with harm to wildlife,47 even to harm to the 
                                                 
45 An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario, at 16. 
46 http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/climatechange/weather.html. 
47 See Stefan Boschen, DDT and the Dynamics of Risk Knowledge Production, 8 INT’L J. FOR 
PHILOSOPHY OF CHEMISTRY 79, (2002), available at http: //www.hyle.org. 
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beloved bald eagle,48 but it was not until DDT was tied to cancer risk in humans that the 
federal government decided to ban the substance.49  The same basic story holds for the 
regulation of many other pollutants.50  Speaking in purely practical terms, therefore, it 
makes a great deal of sense to highlight the consequences of climate change for human 
health. 
 Second, emphasizing the consequences of climate change for human health will 
also affect the way we think about responses to this problem.  If we think of climate 
change as purely an “environmental” problem, we will likely turn, in the U.S., to the 
EPA for an answer.  But as important as the EPA is, domestically, with respect to this 
problem, I believe it is equally vital that we turn to other, non-environmental, 
institutions for assistance.  Framing climate change as a human health threat naturally 
encourages resort to agencies charged with a traditional public health mission, such as 
the Centers for Disease Control and the National Institutes of Health.  It also prompts 
attention to even less obvious institutions, like the United Nations Security Council.  
The point is that we will think differently about solutions to climate change, as an 
institutional matter, if we frame the problem of climate change as a human health 
problem. 
                                                 
48 See David A. Fahrenthold, U.S. Declares Bald Eagles No Longer Threatened, Wash. 
Post (June 29, 2007). 
49 See Boschen, DDT and the Dynamics of Risk Knowledge Production, supra note 47. 
50 Frequently, when the government regulates pollutants that have adverse effects on 
both humans and other species, it highlights the former in justifying the rules.  See Lisa 
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2060-64(1998). 
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 Finally, recognizing the current and future consequences of climate change for 
human health makes the moral case for aggressive action on climate change 
unimpeachable.  If we were simply talking about a more uncomfortable climate, or even 
destruction of other species, it might be easier to dismiss the moral imperative of action 
on climate change.  But humans are dying and falling ill due to our collective actions, 
and will continue to do so in even larger numbers if we do nothing.  Emphasizing the 
human dimension of climate change brings a moral clarity to the problem that is not 
matched by worries about the polar bear. 
II.  THE POST-CAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
 The recognition that climate change is upon us, and harming us, now, leads me 
to suggest one other way to reframe public discourse on this issue.  We should cease 
discussing responses to climate change in terms of the “precautionary principle” and 
should begin to think instead in terms of a “post-cautionary” approach. 
 For a long time, climate change has been the exemplar for application of the 
precautionary principle.51  This principle has taken many forms over the years, but in its 
simplest, and perhaps most common, formulation, it stands for the idea that we should 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive 
Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 566 (2004) (discussing application of 
precautionary principle to climate change). 
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not wait for scientific certainty before acting on a threat.52  The motivating principle is 
that we are better off being safe than being sorry.53  
 At this moment in history, discussing climate change in terms of the 
precautionary principle is, I believe, a serious mistake.  As I discuss below, we probably 
blew past our precautionary opportunity sometime in the 1980s.  We are now, and have 
been for some time, in a post-cautionary world.  The scientific debate over whether 
climate change is happening, and whether it will hurt us, is over; the important 
questions are when it will get worse, and by how much.  I suggest, therefore, that we 
begin to discuss climate change in terms of a “post-cautionary principle.”  Recognizing 
that we have hurtled past precaution into a post-cautionary world has several 
important implications for public policies concerning climate change.  
A.  CLIMATE CHANGE’S PRECAUTIONARY PERIOD 
“To do nothing when the situation is changing 
very rapidly is not a conservative thing to do.” 
 
  -- scientist at 1972 symposium on rising level of CO254 
 
 In this section, I ask two famous questions, but about climate change rather than 
cover-ups: what did we know, and when did we know it?  My aim here is not to 
identify a single precautionary moment for climate change.  My aim, instead, is to argue 
that climate change had not just a precautionary moment but a precautionary period, in 
                                                 
52 John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. 
& POL'Y REV. 13, 13 (2002). 
53 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 851, 851 (1996). 
54 SPENCER R. WEART, THE DISCOVERY OF GLOBAL WARMING 90 (2003). 
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which the evidence of an impending catastrophe was strong enough, and the signs of 
even greater future calamity clear enough, that the precautionary principle, properly 
applied, should have inspired us to take aggressive action.  I believe that period passed 
in the late 1980s. 
 To early climate scientists, the idea of significant “climate change” was 
something of an oxymoron.  Climate was, by definition, stable.55  Indeed, one of the 
great puzzles for early climate scientists was the cause and course of the ice ages: how 
could such a dramatic change in climate have happened, and how long did it take?56  
Perhaps ironically, scientists’ search for the answer to the mystery of the long-ago ice 
ages helped spur the research that led to the “discovery” of climate change in our own 
time.57 
 Scientific understanding of the past and present climate proceeded fitfully at best 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, yet several discoveries from the 
nineteenth century were seminal in the study of climate.  In the early 1800s, Joseph 
Fourier, likening the Earth’s atmosphere to a “hothouse,” speculated that the gases in 
the atmosphere prevented the sun’s radiation from escaping entirely back into space.58  
In 1859, John Tyndall found that carbon dioxide was opaque to infrared radiation, and 
thus trapped some of the Earth’s infrared radiation in the atmosphere.59  In 1896, the 
Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius undertook a computational project fit for a modern 
                                                 
55 WEART at 10. 
56 WEART at 9-11. 
57 WEART at 17-18, 23, 50-51, 76-68, 131-32. 
58 WEART at 3. 
59 WEART at 3-4. 
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computer when he calculated the potential effect on average global temperature of 
changing the level of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere.  His calculations were 
based, of necessity, on a highly simplistic view of the drivers of climate.60  Remarkably, 
however, his estimate of the effect of a doubling of CO2 in the atmosphere – an increase 
in average global temperature of 9-11º Fahrenheit – was not far off from today’s 
estimates.61  Nevertheless, Arhennius’s work slipped into obscurity, picked up here and 
there by other climate scientists in the first half of the twentieth century, but not 
seriously pursued.62 
 Scientific findings that would lead to the discovery of climate change in our time 
began to steadily appear in the mid-twentieth century.  In 1957, Roger Revelle and Hans 
Seuss published a paper concluding that the then-widely accepted view that the oceans 
could be counted upon to absorb any amount of CO2 we belched into the atmosphere 
was mistaken; most of the CO2 that ended up in the oceans “would promptly be 
evaporated.”63  At about the same time, another turning point in the development of 
climate science occurred when Charles David Keeling received funding to measure 
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii and in 
Antarctica.64  With the exception of a brief hiatus in these studies as a result of a funding 
                                                 
60 WEART at 6. 
61 KOLBERT at 41. 
62 WEART, ch. 1; David M. Hart & David G. Victor, Scientific Elites and the Making of US 
Policy for Climate Change Research, 23 SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE 643, 647 (1993). 
63 WEART at 29; Roger Revelle & Hans E. Suess, Carbon Dioxide Exchange between 
Atmosphere and Ocean and the Question of an Increase of Atmospheric CO2 During 
the Past Decades, 9 Tellus 18 (1957).  
64 WEART at 36. 
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cutoff in the early 1960s,65 Keeling’s measurements provided us with the first careful 
and consistent record of actual, year-by-year CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
specific location.66  What they showed proved indispensable to the development of 
modern climate science: CO2 concentrations were on a steady upward path.67 
 Climate scientists also began to apprehend how quickly climate could change.  
Early climate scientists were loathe to admit that the climate could change significantly 
over a short period of time; they thought in terms of geological time, with changes 
occurring over tens of thousands of years.68  Ice core samples from Greenland tested 
and eventually debunked this long-held assumption of stability.  A study published in 
1972, for example, reported that a cold spell that happened some 12,000 years ago – 
dubbed the Younger Dryas – had happened in as little as one or two centuries.69  Ice 
core samples also bore evidence of rapid warming and cooling periods.70  Studies such 
as these upended the comfortable assumption of climate scientists (and perhaps the rest 
of us) of a stable climate, changeable only over many millennia. 
 Another venerable assumption of climate scientists was that of a balance of 
nature, which would lead the climate to take self-correcting actions tending in the 
                                                 
65 WEART at 38. 
66 WEART at 36; Hart & Victor at 651. 
67 WEART at 38; JAMES RODGER FLEMING, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
ch. 9 (1998). 
68 WEART at 38. 
69 WEART at 78; see also TIM FLANNERY, THE WEATHER MAKERS: HOW MAN IS CHANGING 
THE CLIMATE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR LIFE ON EARTH 61 (2005). 
70 WEART at 74, 80. 
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direction of stability rather than instability.71  Scientists in the second half of the 
twentieth century began serious study of the possibility of bad as well as good 
feedbacks; in this system, a rise in temperature could, for example, cause melting of ice 
which would increase the albedo effect of the oceans, which in turn would lead to 
further warming, and so on.72  In this world, spiraling bad effects, rather than self-
correcting reactions tending toward stability, would make a bad situation even worse. 
 By the late 1980s, then, this much was clear.  The greenhouse effect was a 
plausible scientific theory.  Manmade greenhouse gas emissions were increasing.  
Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases were increasing.  The world was 
getting warmer.  Climate could change abruptly.  Once the climate started to change, it 
might deteriorate rapidly due to positive feedback effects.  Rapid climate change had, in 
the past, led to the uprooting and even destruction of whole civilizations. 
 Other important points were less clear.  Was the world’s present warming a 
result, at least in part, of mans greenhouse gas emissions?  What did the future hold?  
Answers to these questions were complicated by scientists’ growing recognition that we 
might not discern the effects of climate change until they were upon us and more 
drastic future effects had become inevitable.73 
 In discussing scientific research spanning a century or more, involving many 
thousands of researchers and untold numbers of studies, it is risky to pinpoint any one 
                                                 
71 WEART at 8-9. 
72 WEART at 85-86. 
73 WEART at 120-22, 137-38; KOLBERT at 11. 
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moment of clarity.74  But in a scientific field as fraught with political meaning as climate 
science is, one can perhaps identify moments when existing scientific research made its 
way into the public consciousness in such a way that public policy might have reacted 
to the emerging understanding.  I believe such a moment happened, among other times, 
in the summer of 1988.  That summer, which saw terrible droughts in the U.S. Midwest 
and unprecedentedly hot weather in the Northeast,75 veteran NASA scientist James 
Hansen came before Congress and announced that global warming was upon us and 
that the greenhouse effect was likely the cause.76  It was time to “stop waffling so 
much,” he said in an interview after his testimony, and to “say that the evidence is 
pretty strong that the greenhouse effect is here.”77 
 Congress did not act on Hansen’s advice.  It passed laws authorizing more 
research on climate change,78 but did nothing to regulate the causes of climate change.  
Indeed, instead of bringing aggressive action on climate change, the years following 
Hansen’s testimony witnessed what I regard as a retrenchment in climate policy.  
Scientists retreated to the newly formed Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
                                                 
74 WEART at 196. 
75 WEART at 155. 
76 Statement of James E. Hansen, Hearing Before the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources, U.S. Senate, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., S. Hrg. 100-461, Pt. 2, at 43 (June 23, 1988).  
See also Statement of Hon. J. Bennett Johnston, id. at 2 (“The greenhouse effect has 
ripened beyond theory now.  We know it is fact.”). 
77 Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate, New York Times 
(June 23, 1988). 
78 Global Change Research Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-606, 104 Stat. 3096; Food, 
Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, Title XXIV, 104 
Stat. 3359; Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, Title XVI, 106 Stat. 2776. 
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(IPCC)79 to develop careful consensus statements on climate change and its effects.80  
The fossil fuel industry began to wage a years-long, multi-million dollar effort to 
persuade the public of the shakiness of climate science.81  Scientific ignorance became 
official government policy.82 
 Into this stew of an emerging scientific consensus and a growing political 
backlash stepped the international environmental community.  In 1992, at the “Earth 
Summit” in Rio, nations agreed to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, which for the first time officially linked responses to climate change to 
the precautionary principle.  Article 3 of the Convention, setting forth the “principles” 
of the document, stated that “The Parties should take precautionary measures to 
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse 
effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into 
account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective 
so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”83  Similarly, the Rio 
Declaration, agreed to at the same time, stated that “In order to protect the 
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to 
                                                 
79 The IPCC was formed in 1988.  Background information on the IPCC is available at  
http://www.ipcc.ch/about/about.htm. 
80 WEART at 161-62. 
81 ROSS GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON 33-61 (1997); WEART at 168. 
82 WEART at 168; ROSS GELBSPAN, BOILING POINT 37-61 (2004); CHRIS MOONEY, THE 
REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 78-101 (2005). 
83 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 108, reprinted in, 31 I.L.M. 849, art. 3(3) 
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their capabilities.  Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures 
to prevent environmental degradation.”84  In the years following the Earth Summit, 
public discourse on climate change and public discourse on the precautionary principle 
almost inevitably merged: climate change policy, said the Government of Canada in a 
typical recent formulation, should be developed with the precautionary principle as a 
guiding framework.85 
 The irony, even tragedy, in this is that the precautionary principle swept onto the 
climate change scene almost at the same moment it could have, and should have, 
departed the field.  Before the Earth Summit, the IPCC – the largest peer-reviewed 
scientific collaboration in the history of the world – had already declared that the world 
was warming and that it was likely that additional warming of several degrees would 
occur by 2050.86  This statement that the world was indeed warming was exactly the 
kind of scientific consensus the precautionary principle declared unnecessary to justify 
action on an impending threat of potentially grave proportions.87  By 1995, of course, 
the IPCC had gone further and identified a “discernible human influence” on the 
                                                 
84 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Annex 1, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879. 
85 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development (2006), 
available at http://www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/c20060900se01.html. 
86 WEART at 162. 
87 John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 13, 27 (2002) (precautionary principle is not “relevant” once “science 
reveals a well characterized risk”). 
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climate, and the long battle over the basic outlines of climate change science could have 
been declared over.   
 Yet things only got worse from there.  The Senate in 1998 announced its intention 
to reject any international agreement on climate change that did not include binding 
requirements for developing nations,88 and in 2001 the Bush Administration withdrew 
from the Kyoto Protocol entirely.89  President George W. Bush himself dismissed a 2002 
report by his own agencies, linking anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate change, as a “report put out by the bureaucracy.”90  In 2003 the White House 
edited out all save one reference to climate change in what was billed as a 
comprehensive report on the environment.91  At the same time, critics of government 
regulation seized on the precautionary principle as a misguided, even dangerous, idea92 
– thus moving the battlefield over climate policy from the scientific arena, where all but 
a few, mostly industry-funded,93 skeptics accepted the ever-more dire predictions of a 
coming climate catastrophe, to the abstract realm of organizing principles for public 
policy.  Perhaps, hinted the critics between the lines, one could reject action on climate 
change by rejecting the precautionary principle – without ever taking a close look at the 
scary scientific consensus on the subject. 
                                                 
88 Byrd-Hagel Resolution, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., S. Res. 98, Rep. No. 105-54. 
89 Eric Pianin, U.S. Aims to Pull Out of Warming Treaty, Wash. Post (Mar. 28, 2001). 
90 Katherine Q. Seelye, President Distances Himself From Global Warming Report, New 
York Times (June 5, 2002). 
91 GELBSPAN at 42. 
92 One of the most prominent critics of the precautionary principle has been Cass 
Sunstein.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1003 (2003). 
93 See, e.g., Chris Mooney, Some Like It Hot, Mother Jones (May/June 2005). 
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 If my account is correct, then the precautionary principle as applied to climate 
change was, at best, an anachronism as soon as it was adopted.  At worst, it 
inadvertently played into the hands of critics of swift and aggressive action on climate 
change, feeding the industry-funded view that the science of climate change was too 
uncertain to justify such action. 
 Subsequent reports of the IPCC, and subsequent events in the world, including 
the collapse of Antarctic ice sheets, melting of glaciers, and thawing of Arctic 
permafrost,94 have only deepened the case for my argument that we have moved from a 
precautionary to a post-cautionary period.  I close with a brief discussion of several 
implications of this development for public policy. 
B.  PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE CONDUCT FOR A POST-CAUTIONARY WORLD 
“It is time to act up.” 
 
-- James Hansen, 
NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies95 
 
 Acknowledging that we have passed the precautionary moment with respect to 
climate change has several implications for public policy.  
 First, stressing the now-inevitable human health consequences of climate change 
makes untenable certain arguments that have been raised against doing much of 
anything at all to address this problem.  All around us appear scare stories about what 
will happen to our economy, and even to our way of life, if we act aggressively against 
                                                 
94 See generally KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE. 
95 James E. Hansen, The Threat to the Planet: How Can We Avoid Dangerous Man-
Made Climate Change?, Remarks On Acceptance of WWF Duke of Edinburgh 
Conservation Medal At St. James Palace, London (Nov. 21, 2006). 
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climate change.96  But, as we have seen, the consequences of not acting are terrible 
indeed.  As the renowned climate researcher James Hansen has put it, if we continue on 
our present course with respect to greenhouse gas emissions, we will soon, quite 
simply, live on “a different planet.”97  Fixing on the human consequences of climate 
change reveals the dangerous ludicrousness of industry’s calls for “business as usual” – 
and their frequent suggestion that this scenario bears zero costs.98  Climate change is 
having and will have profound effects on the economy, with enormous costs.  It is a lie 
to pretend that inaction on climate change is a “no-cost” scenario – for anyone. 
 Second, acknowledging our post-cautionary status means that we cannot hope 
that reduction of greenhouse gas emissions alone will avert the harmful consequences 
of climate change.  We must also adapt to the consequences that we cannot now avoid.  
Some environmentalists have eschewed the idea of adapting to climate change, 
preferring instead to talk only in terms of mitigating the problem through the reduction 
of greenhouse gases.99  They worry, apparently, that if we talk about adapting to 
climate change, we will have less motivation to address the problem in a more 
preventive and fundamental way.  But the problem is upon us, causing harm now.  We 
no longer have the luxury of choosing between adaptation and mitigation; we must do 
both. 
                                                 
96 For a recent example, see Eric Peters, Seppuku for the U.S. Auto Industry, American 
Spectator (July 6, 2007), available at www.americanspectator.org. 
97 Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Expert Says NASA Tried to Silence Him, New York 
Times (Jan. 29, 2006). 
98 See, e.g., Seppuku for the U.S. Auto Industry, supra note 50. 
99 [EDITORS: I have heard people say this, but I don’t yet have a cite.] 
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 Third, it means that we cannot afford to discard any of the actions we are already 
taking to reduce greenhouse gases.  In the United States, in the absence of any federal 
action on the matter, states and local governments have adopted numerous laws and 
policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gases.100  As Congress debates its own potential 
responses to the issue of climate change, it must be careful not to undo any of the steps 
states and local governments have already taken.  It would be easy enough, in a period 
when the Supreme Court has expanded its preemption jurisprudence,101 for Congress 
even inadvertently to displace state and local laws on climate change.  I would go so far 
as to say that unless Congress is willing to pass a very aggressive law (or laws) on 
greenhouse gases, it should simply stay out unless it also enacts language unmistakably 
disclaiming any preemptive intent.  If Congress were to pass a weak law that at the 
same time is held (by the current conservative Court) to preempt state and local efforts 
on climate change, it would be worse than not acting at all. 
 Fourth, in making public policy on climate change, especially in a post-
cautionary world, we must not make the best the enemy of the good.  Many academics 
have devoted loving attention to exactly which kind of regime – international or 
domestic, market-based or technology-based, etc. – is ideal for the problem of climate 
change.  We do not have the luxury of waiting for the ideal solution now, especially 
when the likely favorite among theoreticians – an international trading regime with 
                                                 
100 For discussion, see Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the 
Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOL. L.Q. 183 (2005. 
101 See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 
95, 105-110 (2005). 
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participation by the United States and developing countries such as China – would 
entail a significant lead time.  In this setting, we may do well to use non-obvious 
second-best solutions, including state and local actions to reduce greenhouse gases.   
Indeed, time appears to be so short for effective action on climate change that I believe 
we should even stop waiting around for the government to act on this issue, and take 
the matter into our own hands.  We are all implicated in climate change.  We drive cars, 
switch on the lights, turn up the AC, boot up our computers, and so on.  We don’t have 
to wait for action on climate change; we can use our own inaction – less driving, less 
electricity use, etc. – to start tackling the problem.   
 Finally, and most important, passing from a precautionary to a post-cautionary 
world has large consequences for the moral status of the debate over climate change.  In 
the first part of this paper, I described how gravely human life and health are and will 
be affected by climate change.  In this part of the paper, I have explained that we now 
know that humans will die and fall ill as a result of this problem.  The first describes a 
consequence; the second describes our knowledge of its occurrence.  Knowledge that 
death and suffering will result from our actions uncontroversially leads to a moral 
obligation to change our behavior.  Knowing killing is, in the United States, condemned 
in criminal laws in all fifty states, in modern regulatory laws at the federal level, and in 
civil jury awards in tort cases.102  These laws embody a moral commitment against 
                                                 
102 See Lisa Heinzerling, Knowing Killing and Environmental Law, 14 NYU ENVTL. L.J. 521, 
521-26 (2006). 
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knowing killing that, in traditional criminal contexts, is uncontroversial.  It should be no 
more controversial when it occurs on a global scale. 
CONCLUSION 
 Climate change is a public health threat of the highest order.  Almost every facet 
of human health is being or will be affected by this phenomenon.  Unfortunately, we 
long ago frittered away climate change’s precautionary period.  We are at a stage, now, 
when we can expect large-scale human health consequences from a warming world.  
Perhaps the worst of these consequences can be avoided.  We have a moral imperative 
to try. 
